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PETITION 
Appellant Lenore M. Gill hereby petitions the Supreme Co 
for a rehearing of her appeal upon the basis of the points 
supporting arguments below. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
AND STATUTE 
On the date this appeal was argued and submitted to 
Court, June 10f 1985, the Constitution of Utah, Article VI 
§2, provided in part: 
The Supreme Court shall consist of five 
judges, ... . If a justice of the Supreme 
Court shall be disqualified from sitting in 
a cause before said court, the remaining 
judges shall call a district judge to sit 
with them on the hearing of such cause. 
Article VIII, §2, was amended effective July 1, 1985, 
provide, in part: 
The Supreme Court shall be the highest 
court and shall consist of at least five 
justices. ... If a justice of the Supreme 
Court is disqualified or otherwise unable to 
participate in a cause before the court, the 
chief justice, or in the event the chief 
justice is disqualified or unable to 
participate, the remaining justices, shall 
call an active judge from an appellate court 
or the district court to participate in the 
cause. 
U.C.A. §78-2-3 (1953) provides: 
The concurrence of three justices of 
the Supreme Court is necessary to pronounce 
a judgment; if three do not concur, the case 
must be reheard. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the property-distribution and 
attorney's fee parts of a final judgment entered by the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, in a divorce action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts relevant to the petition presented are as 
follows: The appeal was argued to the five justices of this 
Court and submitted for their decision on June 10, 1985. Prior 
to that date no withdrawal or recusal of any justice had been 
entered in the Court's docket. During oral argument the parties 
were not made aware that any justice would not participate in 
the case. The Court's written decision affirming the judgment 
and order of the trial court was filed on April 29, 1986. 
Justice Durham did not participate in that decision. Appellant 
was given no notice that Justice Durham would disqualify herself 
and that her appeal would be decided by only four justices. 
Those justices who participated in the case were divided evenly 
between the Court's decision and the dissenting opinion. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Because Mrs. Gill did not consent to her appeal being 
decided by four justices, the Court's failure to call another 
judge to participate upon Justice Durham's disqualification 
contravenes the mandatory language of the Constitution of Utah, 
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Article VIII, §2. That failure has materially effected the 
outcome of this appeal to Mrs. Gill's substantial prejudice 
since the remaining members divided evenly between the Court's 
affirming decision and the dissent* The vote of a fifth judge 
could have resulted in reversal. In addition, U.C.A. §78-2-3 
(1953) requires that a case be reheard if three justices do not 
concur in pronouncing a judgment. 
The Court's affirmance of the order below impliedly rejects 
a legal principle recognized under existing Utah case law as 
being applicable to contempt proceedings. The dissenting 
justices urge acknowledgment of that principle of law in ruling 
on this appeal. Resolution of this divergence of opinion on a 
point of law will be critical to the proper functioning of our 
trial courts. 
Lastly, facts central to an equitable assessment of the 
trial judge's ruling have been misapprehended by the Court in 
reaching its decision. 
POINTS OF PETITION 
AND SUPPORTING ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT'S DECISION WAS 
RENDERED CONTRARY TO 
UTAH'S CONSTITUTION. 
Utah's Constitution, Article VIII, §2 [hereinafter ,,§2,,1, 
requires that if a member of the Supreme Court is disqualified 
or unable to participate in a cause another qualified judge 
-3-
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shall be called to sit and participate with the remaining 
justices in that cause. The term "disqualification" has been 
interpreted to include personal interest in the particular case 
on the part of a justice in addition to illness or disability. 
Critchlow v. Monson, 102 Utah 378, 131 P.2d 794, 800 (Utah 
1942); In re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 18, 86, 269 P. 103 
(1927) (disqualification may even include a member's death). 
Disqualification may be accomplished by withdrawal or recusal on 
a judge's own motion whether or not the basis of the 
disqualification is disclosed. Utah's Code of Judicial Conduct, 
Cannon 3, C. and D. 
Notwithstanding the mandatory language of §2 concerning the 
calling of a substitute judge to sit in the absence of a 
justice, this Court has stated in dicta that a case may be 
submitted to the remaining members of the Court for decision if 
the parties consent. In re Thompson's Estate, supra, at 86. In 
that case a substitute district judge was called to sit but no 
challenge to his participation was made until after the decision 
was rendered. Because the case had been argued and submitted 
without objection to the district judge's participation the 
respondent was found to have consented to the composition of the 
court. IcL at 89. 
The necessity for making such an objection in a timely 
manner was reemphasized in Shippers' Best Express, Inc. v. 
Newsom, 579 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1978). There it was argued on 
-4-
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rehearing that Retired Justice Henroid's participation in the 
case for Justice Hall had been improper. This Court held: 
Pursuant to the statute [U.C.A. 
§49-7-5.7 (Supp. 1967)1, Justice Henroid was 
invited to sit on this case. His vote in 
the matter was not needed as the decision 
was a per curiam opinion with two of the 
five justices concurring in the result. Not 
only was his vote immaterial, but the 
appellant is not in a position to complain 
about it for he did not object when the 
appeal was heard and decided by the Court as 
then constituted. He only complains about 
the membership of the Court after the 
decision was rendered partially against him. 
579 P.2d at 1318. 
At footnote 3 of the Shippers1 Best decision the procedure 
employed in an earlier case before this Court in securing the 
parties1 consent to the participation of a retired judge and a 
district court judge was recounted as follows: 
The parties appeared for argument; the 
Chief Justice announced the disqualification 
of two Justices, named those selected to sit 
in their stead, and asked and obtained for 
the parties through their counsel, the 
approval of the court as so constituted. 
579 P.2d at 1318. 
Mrs. Gill's case was argued and submitted to this Court en 
banc. Justice Durham's withdrawal was not announced when the 
parties appeared for argument and no recusal had been entered in 
the clerk's docket prior to that time. The first notice Mrs. 
Gill had that Justice Durham would not participate in the case 
was when she received the Court's written decision. 
-5-
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Given these circumstances and under the facts of the In re 
Thompson's Estate and Shippers1 Best cases it cannot be said 
that Mrs. Gill submitted her case to a panel of only four 
justices by consent. She was given no opportunity to object 
and, thereforef did not waive the constitutional right to have 
her case decided by a full Court. She would not have given such 
consent for two principal reasons: her appellant's burden of 
persuasion would have increased by the proportionate difference 
between three votes of five and three votes of four; andf she 
would have risked the very thing that has occurred/ i.e., a 
50/50 split among the participating justices resulting in 
affirmance of the order below. 
A rehearing is appropriate when a member of a court dies 
after submission of the case and before a decision is rendered 
leaving the remaining justices divided. James v. Clements, 217 
F.51 (5th Cir. 1914). C.f., In re Thompson's Estate, supra, 
(death may constitute "disqualification"). A rehearing was 
found to be necessary where a decision did not have the 
concurrence of the number of judges required by the state's 
constitution. See: Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Burchard, 35 Colo. 
539, 86 P.749, 755 (1906) where it was stated: 
This case was argued and submitted 
prior to April, 1905. It was decided on May 
1, 1905. April 5, 1905, the Old Supreme 
Court, consisting of three judges, ceased to 
exist, and on and from April 5, 1905, the 
constitutional Supreme Court consisted of 
seven judges, and was controlled by the 
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Constitution as amended. After April 5, 
1905/ no solid constitutional decision could 
be rendered by the court unless concurred in 
by at least three judges. The former 
opinion handed down herein was concurred in 
by but two judges, the decision was not in 
conformity with constitutional requirements, 
and, not being such, was a sufficient reason 
for ordering a rehearing before the full 
bench. 
Although the Burchard court sitting e*n banc on rehearing 
sustained the former opinion, in doing so it rejected the 
argument that the railroad company's inclusion of the 
constitutional vote-concurrence point as an additional ground 
for rehearing was untimely, saying: 
[Tlhe original opinion, being on its face in 
plain violation of the Constitution, was a 
nullity. The court was without power to 
hand down a decision concurred in by only 
two justices. The court would have ordered 
a rehearing on its own motion. 
86 P. at 755. 
Mrs. Gill does not cite Burchard to suggest the decision in 
her case is a nullity. However, she does contend that she has 
been denied the constitutional right to have her case decided by 
a five-member Court without her consent and that for this reason 
she can request the Court's decision be set aside. Accordingly, 
by this petition Mrs. Gill invokes the constitutional mandate of 
§2. Had that mandate been observed, the stalemate which has 
occurred on this appeal would have been prevented. 
"To make an application for a rehearing is a matter of 
right, ...," and when the court has overlooked some statute or 
-7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
decisionf or has misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially affects the result of an appeal, a rehearing is 
properly applied for. Cummings v. Nielsen, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 
129 P. 619 (1912) • The mandate of §2 was overlooked in this 
case. That oversight has materially affected the result of this 
appeal in that the vote of a fifth judge may have produced a 
majority for reversal of the lower court's order. It follows 
that Mrs. Gill has been substantially prejudiced in that she has 
been deprived of the opportunity to prevail. 
II. A REHEARING IS REQUIRED 
BY U.C.A. §78-2-3 (1953). 
In the Shippers' Best decision on rehearing the dissent's 
citation of U.C.A. §78-2-3 (1953) as authority to be applied in 
resolving the petition for rehearing was rejected with this 
statement: "That section applied to the pronouncing of a 
judgment. In this casef the judgment has been pronounced." 579 
P.2d at 1318. The judgment to which Justice Ellett was 
Appellant's research revealed no Utah decision by an evenly 
divided four-justice court. Howeverf in those cases where a 
fifth sitting judge's participation has been challenged the 
decisions on rehearing have turned, in part, on whether his vote 
was material to the outcome. See: Shippers' Besty supra, (per 
curiam decision where retired justice's vote was immaterial) and 
People v. Tidwell, 5 Utah 88, 12 P. 638 (1886) (district judge's 
vote was sole dissent from majority; original opinion at 4 Utah 
506.) 
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referring was the main opinion's affirmance of the lower court's 
judgment and verdict. 
In the present case the Court has also affirmed the lower 
court's judgment and order. In so doing it has pronounced a 
"judgment." Because this judgment was not based upon the 
concurrence of three justices a rehearing of Mrs. Gill's appeal 
is required by the express language of U.C.A. 78-2-3 (1953) , to 
wit: 
The concurrence of three justices of 
the Supreme Court is necessary to pronounce 
a judgment; if three do not concur the case 
must be reheard. 
This statute, formerly Comp. Laws Utah 1917f §1644, was 
cited in In re Thompson's Estate in connection with the 
constitutional provision of §2 that a majority of the Supreme 
Court's justices shall constitute a quorum to hold court and 
render a decision. Id. at 85. Although the 1985 amendment of 
§2 deleted this majority requirement except when laws are 
declared unconstitutional, U.C.A. §78-2-3 (1953) was not 
repealed or changed. Accordingly, by statute this Court's 
judgment affirming the order below is required to be set aside 
and Mrs. Gill's appeal reheard. 
-9-
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III. RESOLUTION OF THE COURT'S DIVERGENCE 
ON THE LEGAL ISSUE PRESENTED BY REHEARING 
WILL AVOID INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN OUR 
TRIAL COURTS. 
By affirming the trial court which denied relief to Mrs. 
Gill because it found her husband did not intentionally violate 
its restraining order this Court has impliedly rejected the 
principle of law recognized in Gunnison Irrigation Co. v. 
Peterson, 74 Utah 460, 280 P. 715 (1929), namely: that intent 
to violate a restraining order is irrelevant in a civil contempt 
proceeding in which damages are sought to indemnify a party for 
resulting loss. At the least, the Court's decision has cast 
doubt upon the continuing validity of this legal rule in cases 
of the kind involved in this appeal. 
Restraining orders and injunctions are entered in cases 
where disadvantaged parties must be protected or the status quo 
must be maintained pending a plenary hearing. These are often 
proceedings in equity such as partnership dissolutions, 
receiverships, trustee-cestui disputes and, most significantly 
due to their number, domestic relations matters. When no 
imprisonment or fine is sought to be imposed for violation of 
such an order, the consideration of a no-intent plea serves to 
frustrate the equitable purposes envisioned by the order and 
contributes to cavalier attitudes of obedience to court orders 
and, ultimately, to disrespect for the judicial system. In 
domestic relations cases the ability of our district courts to 
effectively enforce orders of the broad variety they must make 
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would be impeded if in show cause and contempt proceedings it 
was always necessary to determine whether a party "intended" to 
do, or not to dof something given the existence of a valid court 
order compelling or restraining the party's doing of that very 
thing. 
In this case the Court's decision and the dissent's opinion 
could not be more diametrically opposed on this legal issue. 
Chief Justice Hall impliedly holds that Mr. Gill's intent to 
violate the restraining order was relevant by this statement: 
"[A] canvas of the record fails to disclose any evidence that 
clearly preponderates contrary to the findings of the trial 
court that defendant did not hide or secret marital assets in 
violation of the court's order or the rights of plaintiff." 
Neither does the Court find the trial judge misapplied any 
principle of law. Whereas, Justice Zimmerman's dissent states: 
"The Utah courts have long recognized that civil contempt for 
violation of a court order or injunction requires no intent," 
and "the trial court acted contrary to the uncontradicted 
evidence when it refused to find the injunction had been 
violated and to compensate Mrs. Gill accordingly." 
This divergence of opinion—in which the Court's other 
participating members concur—will undoubtedly effect the 
conduct of show-cause and contempt proceedings in our trial 
courts leading to inconsistent results. Under our system of 
government this Court is charged with the duty of clarifying and 
-11-
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pronouncing the law for the instruction of Utah's citizens and 
courts* A rehearing before a full Court will satisfy that 
charge by resolving the confusion created by this divergence. 
IV. THE COURT'S RULING IS BASED UPON 
A MISAPPREHENSION OP THE FACTS. 
Appellant suggests that the Court's assessment of the 
equities in this case, as reflected by the facts recited in its 
decision, was derived from a misapprehension of the true facts 
concerning Defendant's operation of the businesses in question 
and his unilateral control and disposition of the Fleetwayf 
Inc., assets. 
The uncontroverted record facts establish the following: 
When the parties separated on September 6, 1979, the Gill's 
Tire Market business was defunct (R.420) and before the end of 
1979 it was in bankruptcy (R.186-87, 420-21). The Fleetway Tire 
business was shut down the same week the parties separated 
(Exhibit P-7; R.278-79) and it never resumed operations. So, 
neither at the time the parties separated, nor at the time the 
divorce complaint was filed ten days later, nor at the time the 
restraining order was entered against Defendant on October 29, 
1979, nor at the time the divorce decree was entered on January 
22, 1980, was he operating either of the businesses or making a 
living therefrom. 
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After Fleetway was closed in September 1979, Defendant 
stored the idle assets and equipment of that business at various 
locations in Salt Lake County (R.205, 278-79, 296, 385-86) 
unknown to Mrs. Gill. They were not used again until October 
1980, a year after the restraining order had been entered/ at 
which time Defendant opened the Tire City business (R.205, 210, 
365-69). His unilateral use and disposition of those assets was 
the subject of Mrs. Gill's discovery from the outset of the 
divorce action which discovery he evaded and disregarded 
notwithstanding her repeated applications and motions to the 
court for his compliance. 
Contrary to the Court's recited understanding, the Gill's 
Tire Market and Fleetway, Inc., businesses were not ongoing and 
the parties were not dependent upon them for their livelihood 
during the period after their separation and up to the entry of 
the divorce decree. At the time the restraining order was 
entered it was not contemplated that Defendant would continue to 
operate them. Accordingly, it was not reasonable to conclude 
either that Mrs. Gill was aware of her ex-husband's business 
revenues or that she knew of his use of the Fleetway assets in 
his losing Tire City venture. 
Lastly, the focal issue at trial was not Mrs. Gill's 
contention that her husband had "intentionally" secreted or 
disposed of marital assets. She assumed no such burden of 
proof. Rather, the difficult fact issues to which her evidence 
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was directed were the identificationf location and valuation of 
the Fleetwayf Inc.r assets which had been under her husband's 
exclusive control at all times after their separation. If any 
statement was made during trial regarding Defendant's "intent11 
such reference was made only to emphasize what Mrs, Gill 
perceived to be the equities supporting her case and not by way 
of an acknowledgment that it was a fact required to be proved by 
her. 
CONCLUSION 
For the constitutional, statutory and equitable reasons set 
out above Appellant's appeal should be reheard. 
COUNSEL'S CERTIFICATION 
By his subscription to this Petition for Rehearing 
Appellant's counsel certifies that it is presented in good faith 
and not for delay. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I TTSay Of May 1986. 
! > 




Attorney for Appellant 
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